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ABSTRACT
Vaccination has been deemed the most cost-effective way to fight against preventable diseases
and improve global health. In recent years, expensive combination vaccines which provide
multiple antigens in a single shot have been developed to replace traditional monovalent
vaccines and have become the preferred choice of healthcare systems in industrialized countries.
High prices have not only barricaded low-income countries from accessing combination vaccines
but also lure vaccine manufacturers to shift their production capacity from making traditional
vaccines to combination vaccines. Such a shift could eventually lead to shortages on the vaccine
supply for low-income countries. This work extends the ABP model proposed by Proaño [18]
which optimally prices vaccines under tiered pricing strategy to make them affordable and
available across different market segments. This thesis first introduces a heuristic method to
solve the ABP. Second, this thesis presents an optimization model to decide the minimum
amount of subsidy needed to make an expensive combination vaccine affordable to people in a
low-income country
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1. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 1 of the thesis introduces the history of vaccination
and the current state of global immunization, and describes existing problems in the global
vaccine market. Section 1 also introduces the Antigen Bundle Pricing (ABP) problem developed
by Proano [18], which aims to optimize the allocation and pricing of vaccine in the global
market. Section 2 presents a heuristic approach to solve the ABP problem as well as some
enhancements on the original ABP model. Section3 presents an optimization model to determine
the minimum subsidy required in order to support the immunization needs of a developing
country. The solution resulted from the heuristics approach in Section 2 can be used as input data
for the optimization model in Section 3.

1.1 A brief history of vaccines and immunization
Among medical treatments, immunization is considered the most cost effective way to fight
diseases [1]. On average, each dollar invested in immunization saves up to $USD 27 of health
expenses [1]. Currently immunization can protect people from a wide range of diseases; and
readily available vaccines can be used to prevent up to 25 diseases worldwide, many of which
are fatal or could result in severe disabilities [2].
Throughout human history, epidemics have been one of the major enemies of mankind.
For example, smallpox and tuberculosis, killed nearly 30% of all new-born children in ancient
China [4]. In 1918, the first recorded influenza pandemic killed over 40 million people all over
the world [3]. Solely in China and during the 20th century, it is estimated that hundreds of
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thousands of children have been paralyzed due to polio [4]. Influenza strains such as H5N1 and
the newly emerged H1N1 have challenged public health care systems around the globe, resulting
in massive financial costs and major public concern.
Vaccines introduce weak or killed antigenic materials into the human body in order to
stimulate the immunity system so that it would effectively react upon a future infection [1]. The
first believed attempt of vaccination occurred in India and China 200BC, where people tried to
prevent smallpox by purposely getting in contact with cowpox infected patients [5]. In the late
18th century, British physician Edward Jenner applied cowpox on humans to prevent smallpox.
His attempts were effective and marked the beginning of modern vaccination [7]. Louis Pasteur
later developed techniques that lead to vaccines protecting against bacterial anthrax and viral
rabies [8]. Nowadays, most of the infectious diseases that used to threaten humanity can be
effectively prevented through vaccination. The currently proposed immunization schedule in
USA protects children against 16 diseases, not including seasonal influenza [9, 10]. Similarly,
most countries around the world maintain immunization schedules based on their national health
needs.
The global application of vaccines has been highly successful. The eradication of
smallpox was achieved in 1979 [5]. Poliomyelitis endemics are now occurring only in four
countries (Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and Nigeria), with less than 1,600 reported cases annually
[11]. Additionally, general vaccination efforts have decrease the occurrence of measles and it
seems to become the next disease to be eradicated [1, 26].
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1.2 Advent of combination vaccine and its impact to vaccine industry
Before 1990s, all vaccines accessible to the public were monovalent vaccines, which provide
protection against one disease. As new types of vaccines were developed and integrated in the
national immunization requirements, the immunization schedules became very congested. For
example, in order to receive all required vaccines exclusively through monovalent vaccines, a
child in the USA would have to receive 24 injections before age 2 [9].
In the last 20 years, new vaccines have been developed that can simultaneously provide
protection against multiple diseases in one injection. These new vaccines, commonly referred as
combination vaccines, have soon become the preferred choice for parents and pediatricians
because of the fewer injections and clinic visits needed to fully immunize a child. For instance,
using available combination vaccines a child in the USA only needs 11 injections before age 2 to
receive full protection based on immunization schedule [9]. Due to this customer preference,
combination vaccines are expensive and provide vaccine manufacturers an opportunity to
increase their profit. In the year 1990, the global vaccine market value was only $USD 2.9
billion [21]. By the year 2008, due to the introduction of new combination vaccines, the
estimated value of global vaccine market increased to $USD 20.5 billion [21].
Due to their high price and licensing restrictions, new combinatorial vaccines are not
accessible to people in developing countries. Therefore, the immunization requirements of
people in the poorest developing countries mainly rely on simple (often monovalent) traditional
vaccines. This has lead to a divergence on the type of vaccines consumed in industrialized
countries and low-income developing countries. Moreover, the high profit margin provided by
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the sale of combination vaccines has driven vaccine manufacturers to shift production capacity
from less-expensive traditional vaccines to combination vaccines [14].
Evidence has shown that for some of the poorest countries in Africa, although their
economies have expanded in the past years, their immunization status has actually deteriorated.
In sub-Saharan African countries, immunization coverage dropped from 55% in year 1990 to
53% in year 2000 [12]. Extreme cases are the Central African Republic and Republic of Congo,
where immunization coverage dropped respectively from 79% and 82% in year 1990 to 33% and
29% in year 2000 [12]. It is estimated that in 2000, about 33 million children worldwide missed
out on routine immunization during their first year of life due to shortage of vaccine supplies
[12]. Until the year 2005, there were still more than 50 countries with the “under 5 mortality rate
(U5MR)” higher than 100 per 1000 birth, with 90% of these casualties due to vaccine
preventable diseases [15].

1.3 Tiered pricing strategy in global vaccine market
Since their establishment, the World Health Organization (WHO), as well as the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), has made major efforts to support proper immunization systems for
low-income countries, especially in Africa and Southeast Asia. In 2000, the Global Alliance for
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) was launched as a joint effort of the United Nations
agencies, governments, foundations, donors and academic institutions. In vaccine market, GAVI
and UNICEF are considered as altruist organizations that purchase vaccines from manufacturers
and distribute vaccines to developing countries. In year 2009, UNICEF purchased 2.9 billion
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doses of vaccines for children in 82 countries, which consists of 40 percent of global vaccine
purchase in 2009 [15].
GAVI and UNICEF purchase and distribute large amount of vaccines, as a result they
have enormous bargain power on both sides of the market. A tiered pricing system had been used
by UNICEF since 1970s for the distribution of vaccines [17]. Tiered pricing system refers to the
pricing strategy in which different groups of customers are charged different prices for the same
product. In the context of vaccines, low-income countries are charged a reduced price compared
with buyers from developed countries [23]. The pneumococcal vaccine, for instance, has been
provided by GAVI to low-income countries at $USD 3.5 per dose, which is one tenth of the
average price in developed countries [24].
Under the tiered pricing policy, vaccine consumers in poorer countries are subsidized by
vaccine buyers from industrialized countries, which seems to be unfair. However, analysts and
researchers such as Plahte [17] have pointed out that this tiered pricing system in fact results in a
win-win-win situation. Plahte [17] reasoned that a tiered pricing system removes the price barrier
which otherwise prevents poor countries from accessing vaccines. As a result, under a tiered
pricing policy, the vaccine manufacturers face an expanded market and can recover faster their
research and development cost (R&D cost), which is the largest portion of vaccine
manufacturing cost. Plahte [17] also claimed that in tiered pricing, consumers in developed
countries are charged lower prices per dose of vaccine.

5

1.4 Antigen Bundle Pricing (ABP) model
Given that vaccines are distributed under tiered pricing, then a challenge arises when a wide
variety of combination vaccines are available in the market. To provide protection against a set
of diseases, one can use only monovalent vaccines, use both monovalent vaccines and
combination vaccines, or use solely combination vaccines. Based on the income level, customers
in different countries may have different preferences for each type of vaccine. As a result, a
decision has to be made on how to allocate and price vaccines among different countries to
achieve maximum total benefit for the entire market.
To answer these questions, Proano [18] proposes the Antigen Bundle Pricing (ABP)
optimization model. The ABP model generates solutions revealing optimal vaccine allocation
between vaccine buyers and manufacturers, and suggests a set of vaccines prices. The optimal
vaccine allocation generated by the ABP model is referred as ABP allocation. ABP allocation
maximizes the overall financial benefit gained by all members of the vaccine market while
ensuring that each country satisfies their immunization needs, supply capacity is respected, and
by considering vaccine price elasticity. The vaccine price generated by the ABP model
guarantees that vaccines will be provided to customers affordably, while all manufacturers are
guaranteed a minimum profit.

1.4.1 Concepts in the ABP model
The ABP model is based on a hypothetical vaccine market. The following concepts have
been utilized when building the vaccine market in the ABP model.

6

(a). Market segments
Every country in the world needs vaccines. The ABP model divides the global vaccine
market into market segments based on income level. Countries in the same market segment are
assumed to have the same reservation price for each type of vaccine. Reservation price is
referred as the maximum amount of money that a market segment is willing to pay for a vaccine
dose.
(b). Antigen bundles
The ABP model treats vaccines as indivisible bundles of antigens. A monovalent vaccine
is considered as a bundle containing only one type of antigen. A bundle cannot contain more
than one dose of each type of antigen. Figure 2 shows some examples of antigen bundles.

MONOVALENT VACCINE
BUNDLES

COMBINATION VACCINE
BUNDLES
MMR Vaccine

DTP Vaccine

Measles
Measles

Diphtheria
Mumps

Rubella

Rubella

Mumps

Tetanus
Toxoids

Acellular
Pertussis

Figure 1: Illustration on antigen bundles

In the ABP model, immunization demand of market segments is expressed on antigen
units. The demand is satisfied by purchasing vaccine bundles containing the demanded antigens.
The number of possible antigen bundles grows exponentially when the number of different
7

antigens increases. If

denotes the number of different antigens available and

number of all possible different types of bundles, then

corresponds to

represents the
.

(c). Vaccine manufacturers
In the ABP model, each vaccine manufacturer is capable of providing a set of vaccine
bundles. Since expanding vaccine production capacity is expensive and lengthy, each
manufacturer is assumed to have a fixed production capacity for each type of vaccine bundle
they produce. A high R&D cost is always needed for the prolonged development phase of a
vaccine. Additionally, vaccines are generally produced in large batches and the marginal
production cost per dose can be insignificant. In fact, the production cost per dose of most liveattenuated vaccines is on the order of pennies of $USD [6]. Therefore, the ABP model assumes
that the most significant production cost for a manufacturer results from R&D cost to develop a
bundle. It is also assumed that a manufacturer decides to produce a bundle only when it is
profitable.
(d). Total social surplus
Total social surplus (TSS) reflects the total benefit gained by all entities across the
vaccine market through vaccine trading. The ABP model assumes that intermediate
organizations like GAVI and UNICEF are altruist and do not withhold benefit during vaccine
trading. Therefore, TSS equals the aggregation on the total profit earned by all manufacturers
and total customer surplus obtained by all market segments. The total profit is calculated by
subtracting production cost from total revenue. The total customer surplus is defined as the
aggregate difference between customer’s reservation price of a bundle and the bundle's actual
selling price.
8

1.4.2 Formulation of the ABP model.
This section describes the mathematical formulation of ABP model as well as its
notations.
(a). Sets.
Set of all antigens
Set of all antigen bundles
Set of all market segments
Set of all vaccine producers
Set of antigens provided by bundle

, with

Set of antigens required by market segment
Bundles that supply antigen

, with

, with

Bundles manufactured by producer

, with

Subset of bundles in
that, when combined together, provide an
equivalent antigen offering to bundle
,
Set of all possible subset of bundles

for

,

(b). Parameters
Reservation price of bundle

in market segment

Annual number of children born per year in market
Annual cost that needs to be recovered for bundle

manufactured by

producer
Number of units of antigen
child in market segment

9

required to provide full immunity to a

Binary parameter indicating access limitation of market segments on
bundles.

if bundle

is accessible to market segment

;

otherwise
Production capacity for producer

to produce bundle

Maximum number of doses of bundle
a child in market segment

that could be administered to

to avoid over immunization

Scaling constant used to model vaccine demand elasticity
(c). Variables
The number of doses of bundle

, supplied by vaccine producer

and offered to market segment

. The values of variable

in the solution gives the vaccine allocation in the market
Price per dose of bundle

, supplied by vaccine producer

and

offered to market segment
Binary variable corresponds to production plan of vaccine producers.
if vaccine producer

decide to manufacture bundle

;

otherwise.

(d). Formulation
The ABP model maximizes the total benefit obtained across the vaccine market, which is
reflected by total social surplus (TSS) generated during vaccine trading. The TSS is comprised of
two components which are the total profit earned by vaccine manufacturer and the total customer
surplus obtained by market segments.
The total profit (TP) corresponds to the aggregated revenue minus the aggregated cost,
and is given by equation (1.4.1). The total customer surplus (TCS) is calculated by aggregating
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over each sold bundle on the difference between the reservation price of the buyer and the actual
selling price. Equation (1.4.2) gives the formulation for total customer surplus. The total social
surplus is the sum of the total profit and the total customer surplus, which is given by (1.4.3).

Equation (1.4.4) gives the objective function of the ABP model.

The mathematical formulation of the ABP model is presented in the next page.
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1.4.3 The optimal bundle prices
Proano [18] show that the objective function of the ABP model given by (1.4.4) does not
include the price variables

and therefore TSS is independent on the value of bundle prices.

So maximizing the TSS leads to a solution which gives optimal bundle allocation and optimal
bundle production plan. However, the resulting prices corresponding to such bundle allocation
are just feasible values. The bundle prices have major impact on the share of profit and customer
surplus in the TSS. For a given vaccine allocation consumers are harmed when prices are set too
high, while manufacturers lose profit if the prices are set too low. Therefore, in order to find out
the appropriate value of bundle price that benefits vaccine producers and market segments, a two
stage method is applied.
The first stage solves the ABP model and the solution gives the optimal bundle
allocation
resulting

as well as the optimal production plan
and

. Then in the second stage, the

for all bundles, markets and producers are used as input parameters for

two optimization models, ABP_PF and ABP_CS. The solution of ABP_PF model and ABP_CS
model respectively provides the upper bound and lower bound for the feasible bundle prices, for
which the ABP bundle allocation

is still optimal.

(a). The ABP_PF model
The objective function of the ABP_PF model maximizes the total profit which is
expressed by equation (1.4.1). Since
ABP_PF model is vector of

and

are parameters, the only variable in the

containing the bundle prices for each possible bundle

allocation. Therefore the value of

is always a constant and can be omitted

13

from the objective function of the ABP_PF model. Equation (1.4.13) provides the objective
function for the ABP_PF model.

The ABP_PF model must also satisfy all constraints from the original ABP model so that
the bundle price generated combined with the optimal bundle allocation is still feasible for the
original ABP model. In the ABP model, constraints (1.4.6), (1.4.7) and (1.4.12) do not contain
pricing variables. Since the values of

and

are optimal values to the ABP model, it is

guaranteed that these constraints are already satisfied from the input allocation vector, and hence
they could be omitted. Constraint (1.4.5) can also be ignored since the value of each

is known

and treated as a constant in the second stage models. The resulting formulation is presented as
following.
Formulation: The ABP_PF Model
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The solution generated by ABP_PF model is denoted by all

. The value of each

gives the upper bound of bundle prices for a given ABP optimal allocation

and

.

(b). The ABP_CS model
Opposite to ABP_PF, the ABP_CS model maximizes the total customer surplus obtained
by market segments, which is given by equation (1.4.2a).

Only ABP constraints that contain bundle pricing variables

are included in the

ABP_CS model. The formulation of the ABP_CS model is presented as follows.
Formulation: The ABP_CS Model
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Since

and

are input parameters, the value of

is

constant and can be removed from (1.4.18). So (1.4.18) can be converted to (1.4.19) as below.

Therefore, the solution of the ABP_CS model gives the value of
bound for bundle prices for a given ABP optimal allocation

and

which is the lower
.

(c). Construct the optimal prices for the ABP model

Let

and

be the vectors which contain all elements of

ABP_PF and ABP_CS. Any bundle prices within the range defined by
with the optimal allocation

and

and

given by

and , when combined

, form an optimal solution to the original ABP model.

The optimal price is defined as a linear combination of

and , which is given by equation

(1.4.20). Figure 3 illustrates how the bundle price is calculated.

In (1.4.20), the value of

determines for a given optimal bundle allocation, whether the

prices will benefit more to vaccine producers or to market segments. For

, the

market segments obtain a greater customer surplus while the vaccine produces receive reduced
amount of profit. For

, the solution benefits more on vaccine producers.

implies that market segments and vaccine producers split the total social surplus generated
during the vaccine trading.
16

generated by ABP_PF
The range of bundle
price which is feasible
to the ABP model

Bundle Price:

generated by ABP_CS
Figure 2: How to calculate bundle price

1.4.4 Summary on how the ABP model is solved

Solve ABP _PF
model with
and
as input
and
Solve ABP
model

, and forms
the ABP solution.
Solve ABP _CS
model with
and
as input

Stage 2

Stage 1

Figure 3: Illustration on how the ABP model is solved
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1.5 A brief literature review
Vaccine availability in developing countries has become a serious issue and has raised concerns
of scholars in the area of economics, public policy as well as operations research for the past 10
year. There has been significant research related to this area. In one paper, Wilson, P. [6] pointed
out that the drop in vaccine availability in developing countries is due to the high prices of new
vaccines which hinder their use in developing countries. He also argued that by employing tiered
pricing, vaccine producers can offer vaccines to developing countries at significant discounts,
and thus enable wider coverage of new vaccines. The tiered pricing strategy is further studied by
Plahte, J. [17], who shows in his article that tiered pricing is not necessarily a process in which
industrialized countries merely subsidize vaccine consumers in developing countries. Plahte [17]
shows that compared with single pricing, tiered pricing system leads to a win-win-win situation
in which consumers from industrialized countries and developing countries all receive increased
benefit, while vaccine manufacturers gain higher profits. Assuming tiered pricing of vaccines,
Proano [18] presents an O.R. based approach to allocate and price vaccine optimally. The
optimal vaccine allocation guarantees the maximization on the total social welfare obtained by
vaccine consumers as well as producers. The optimal allocation also guarantees that new-born
children in all countries can be vaccinated affordably, while vaccine producers can have desired
profit by selling vaccines to developing countries. Pricing of vaccines has been studied by other
scholars such as McGuire, T. [22] who in his paper discusses how to use an economics model to
set the prices of new vaccines based on the potential cost, probability of R&D success as well as
the prospective benefit that a consumer can have by using the vaccine. Danzon and Towse [28]
analyze the use of Ramsey price to decide pharmaceuticals prices under price discrimination
rule. Oddone [29] discusses in his paper about cost-benefit of vaccine R&D; Kremer [30] as well

18

as Jessing and R. Nuscheler [31] analyze how governments should intervene in vaccine markets.
These discussions are limited to monovalent vaccines.
There have also been papers talking about the effects of subsidy on vaccine availability of
developing countries. In his paper, Hinman, AR. [27] pointed out that a stable reimbursement
system is essentially important for maintaining a high immunization rate for children below 35
month as well as people over 65 years old. Kemp and Nagishi [32] has analyzed the effects of
subsidy in international commercial. Behrman [33] discusses the importance of subsidy in
providing public interest goods such as school attendance.
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2. CHAPTER 1: A HEURISTIC APPROACH TO SOLVE THE ABP
PROBLEM
The ABP is a Mixed-Integer Non-Linear Problem, which Proano [18] proved to be NP-hard.
Thus this thesis presents a heuristics method to approximate the optimal solution of ABP
problem. When the ABP model solves for only one bundle type or a small subset of bundle
types, the required solution time is greatly reduced. Therefore, the heuristic determines a near
optimal bundle allocation by solving a sequence of small problems in which one-bundle is solved
at a time. The sequence at which these problems are solved has been carefully crafted so that the
allocations of bundles that have higher contributions to the TSS are solved first.
Combination bundles are preferred over monovalent bundles by customers in all markets
segments. As a result, when receiving combination bundles, market segments always obtain high
customer surplus. The high reservation price on combination vaccines allows manufacturers to
charge higher price and increase profit. As a result, combination vaccines always generate higher
total social surplus than monovalent vaccines.
Therefore, the heuristic approach to be presented in this thesis solves the ABP model
iteratively, with only one type of combination bundle solved in each iteration. After the ABP
iterations solves for all the combination bundles, the remaining unmet demand will be satisfied
by allocating monovalent bundles. The corresponding model for the heuristics method is a
reduced version of the original ABP model, here referred as the ABP_R(i) model, where index
represents the type of bundle solved in each iteration.

20

2.1 Assumptions of the ABP_R(i) model
The ABP_R(i) model solves the same problem as the ABP model. Therefore, the assumptions
taken by the ABP model are also applicable to the ABP_R(i) model. However, there are risks
associated with the iterative approach of the ABP_R(i) model, which need to be mitigated by
additional assumption.
When solving ABP_R(i) for a bundle in iteration , the model tries to maximize total
social surplus by allocating as many doses of bundle as possible, regardless of any iteration that
comes after . Since vaccine demand is iteratively updated based on ABP_R(i) solution, it is
possible that after iteration , the residual demand becomes infeasible for all future iterations.
Therefore, a problem that is feasible for the ABP model could be infeasible for the ABP_R(i)
model. Figure 4 shows such an example. The scenario contains two customers

and

as

well as three types of antigen A, B and C. The demands of customers on antigens are shown in
Figure 5. The bundles available are two doses each of bundle
each of bundle

and

and

as well as one dose

.

From Figure 4, it can be seen that when all three types of bundle are solved
simultaneously which imitates the ABP approach, a feasible bundle allocation exists which
allocates two doses of bi-antigen bundles to each customer. However for the same scenario,
assume ABP_R(i) solves for tri-antigen bundle
complex bundle, then one dose of bundle
residual demand is one dose of

for

in the 1st iteration since it is the most

is allocated to each customer. Consequently, the

and one dose of

for

any remaining bundle since over-immunization is not allowed.

21

, which cannot be satisfied by

Demand

Demand

ABP allocation (feasible)

ABP_R(i) allocation (infeasible)

Figure 4: Example when the ABP_R(i) approach fails to generate feasible solution

In order to mitigate such a risk, the ABP_R(i) model takes an assumption that the supply
of monovalent bundles is unlimited. This is a fair assumption since in reality, the production
process of monovalent bundles is much cheaper and simpler, and therefore the production
capacity of monovalent bundles can be promptly expanded by vaccine manufactureres. The new
assumption guarantees the feasibility of the ABP_R(i) model since even in the worst case when
no combination bundle is allocable, the vaccine demand can still be satisfied by allocating
monovalent bundles.
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2.2 Formulation of the ABP_R(i) model
In the ABP model, set

corresponds to the set of bundles. In the ABP_R(i) model, set

is

divided into the following two sets.

Compared with the ABP model, ABP_R(i) model includes one additional ordered set.

The ABP_R(i) model assumes that in iteration , the only available bundle type in the
market is . However, when

, the production capacity of bundle is limited. So it is very

unlikely that the amount of available combination bundle satisfies demand from all market
segments. Therefore, in the ABP_R(i) formulation, constraint (1.4.6) in the ABP model which
enforces demand satisfactory must be replaced by its relaxation given by equation (2.2.2).

Additionally, it is impossible to compare the utilities of different types of bundles in
different market segments when solving ABP_R(i) for one bundle at a time. Therefore constraint
(1.4.5) in the original ABP model is ignored in the formulation of the ABP_R(i) model.
All the other constraints from the ABP model are kept in the ABP_R(i) model. The
mathematical formulation of the ABP_R(i) model is presented next.
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Formulation: The ABP_R(i) Model
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2.3 The Sorting Criteria
The heuristics approach behind the ABP_R(i) model is essentially a greedy approach which
disaggregates the set of bundles into smaller subsets and iteratively solves each subset. Different
types of combination bundles, when allocated to market segments, can generate different amount
of total social surplus. Therefore, when ABP_R(i) model maximizes the total social surplus in
each iteration, the final TSS generated after all bundles are solved may not be optimal. For
instance, assume that there exists a polyvalent bundle with high volume of supply while
generates very low TSS. If this bundle is allocated to all market segments in an early ABP_R(i)
iteration and satiates all demands, then the final TSS is impaired since other bundles more
capable of generating TSS are blocked in following iterations.
Therefore, to ensure the maximization on TSS, it is important to define the sequence by
which different bundles are solved by ABP_R(i) so that bundles generating lower TSS do not
take precedence over bundles generating higher TSS.
From equation (1.4.3) in previous section, it is clear that when a producer decides to
provide a bundle (i.e.

, then the TSS generated by

results from the reservation

price that customers in different markets have on the bundle as well as the development cost
required for producing the bundle. A bundle that is more preferred by customers (i.e. higher
value of

) and requires less development investment per dose (lower value of

results in higher TSS. As a result, we propose sorting all bundles by descending values of
expressed by (2.3.1). Then the polyvalent bundle with higher values of
capable of generating TSS and will be solved in earlier iteration of ABP_R(i).
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) would
as

is considered more

In equation (2.3.1),

represents the priority of bundle to be solved in ABP_R(i).

represents the residual demand at market segments

for bundle up to the current iteration.

Figure 5 illustrates the procedure of using the ABP_R(i) model to allocate bundles.

Satisfy the unmet
antigen demand
with bundles in MB

Final allocation
and production plan
obtained

Update
and

Y
Initialization: assign
priority to all bundles
in
based on (2.3.1)

Remove
from

N
Include into where
being the bundle with
highest priority in

Remove
from

Update priority of all
bundles in
based on
the new value of
market segments
Update antigen demand
and residual bundle demand
for all market segments

Solve the
ABP_R(i) model

Update
and
based on the
allocation of bundle

Figure 5: Illustration on how ABP_R(i) generates bundle allocation

The ABP_R(i) model substitutes the ABP model only to generate bundle allocation
variable

as well as bundle production variable

. Then the ABP_PF and ABP_CS

models can be used to get bundle prices as described in sub-section 1.4.3.
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2.4 Computational results
In order to compare the performance of the original ABP model and the ABP_R(i) model, this
thesis experiments on the two models using the same input data. The data used in this thesis was
originally provided by Proano [18]. Figure 6, 7, 8 and 9 present experiment data in detail.

Figure 6: Bundles supplied by manufacturers
Figure 6 shows that the experiment data contains 15 different types of vaccine bundle
provided by 3 vaccine manufacturers. There are 4 market segments in the experiment; Figure 7
provides information on each of the market segment. Based on their income levels, different
market segments have different reservation prices on each type of bundle, which is described in
Figure 8, which also describes the supply capacity of each bundle. In order to have full
protection, a child needs to receive multiple doses of the same antigen. The number of doses of
antigen that a child anticipates to receive is given in Figure 9.
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Figure 7: Description of market segments

Figure 8: Reservation prices and supply features of different bundles

Figure 9: Number of doses needed to provide full immunization to a child
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Solving the problem using the original ABP model requires around 3,000 seconds of
solution time when using KNITRO as the solver. When using the ABP_R(i) approach, the time
needed to solve the same problem is 10 seconds, which is 1/300 compared with the original ABP
model.
When the supply of bundle 15 (DtaP-HBV-HiB-IPV, which is the most complex vaccine
in the data example) equals to 175 million doses, the total social surplus generated by the ABP
optimal solution is around USD$ 16.451 billion. For the ABP_R(i) approach, the total social
surplus generated equals to $USD 16.440 billion which corresponds to a decreases of 0.07%
compared with the original ABP model.

Figure 10: ABP allocation vs. ABP_R(i) allocation
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Figure 10 shows vaccine allocations generated by the original ABP model and the
ABP_R(i) approach. The black bar corresponds to the ABP allocation while grey bar
corresponds to the ABP_R(i) allocation. The up arrow and down arrow show the range of bundle
prices that are feasible for the resulting ABP allocation. The supply of bundle 15 is 175 million
for the problem instance solved in Figure 10.
From Figure 10, it can be observed that for most of the bundles, the ABP allocation and
ABP_R(i) allocation are consistent. Therefore, the ABP_R(i) model generates vaccine bundle
allocation that is close to the ABP optimal allocation while significantly reduces the solution
time required.
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3. CHAPTER 2: THE SWAP MODEL TO SOLVE THE SUBSIDY
PROBLEM
In order to improve the health condition of women and children in developing countries, a key
component is to improve their vaccines accessibilities. Although optimization models such as
ABP and the heuristics presented in this thesis can determine vaccine tiered prices that reduce
their costs, several vaccines may still remain unaffordable to the poorest countries. As a result,
vaccine subsidies are necessary to make a vaccine commercially attractive in an otherwise
unprofitable market. For example, the price per dose of pneumococcal vaccines is offered at
$USD 3.50 in low-income countries while at more than $USD 90 in the U.S. Within the $USD
3.50, only less than $USD 0.3 is paid by consumers in low-income countries, while GAVI
provides financial support to cover the remaining $USD 3.2 [15].
In 2006, UNICEF proposed the Global Immunization Vision and Strategy (GIVS),
which aimed to reduce the vaccine-preventable disease mortality by two-thirds by year 2015
compared with year 2000 [20]. However, to realize this ambitious goal, $USD 15 billion of
funding needs to be raised before year 2015 [20]. These funds were to be spent on aiding the
developing countries purchasing vaccines and injection supplies, building up sanitation and
hygienic facilities as well as hiring medical personnel. Current donations for vaccines are
primarily contributed by private foundations, governments and individual philanthropists. In
2009, GAVI had cumulatively received and spent $USD 4.5 billion since its establishment in
2000. Meanwhile, a further $USD 4 billion funding has been committed until year 2015 which
aimed at improving immunization programs in 72 of the poorest countries [26]. From the year
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2000 to 2009, the amount of money GAVI has spent on purchasing or subsidizing vaccines for
developing countries accounts for 65% of its total expenditure [26].
Cold chain is required in the transportation and storage of vaccines, which is not
available in poor countries. Therefore, providing subsidy to allow the use of combination
vaccines in developing countries is valuable because the required logistics expenditure can be
greatly reduced. Since there are limitations on the total available funding, it is valuable for
donors and organizations such as GAVI to determine the minimum subsidy needed by individual
developing countries, and therefore expand the global immunization. This chapter presents an
optimization model to determine the minimum subsidy needed to ensure that allocating a
complex combination vaccine to a low-income country is commercially attractive. However,
given that the production capacity of vaccine manufacturers is limited, introducing a complex
vaccine in a poor country impacts the available supply of several vaccines in other countries, and
it could even results in a change of vaccine allocation for the whole vaccine market. Therefore,
the optimization model presented in this chapter simultaneously maximizes the total social
surplus of entire vaccine market when such an allocation change occurs.
The first section of the chapter introduces the general background and basic assumptions
of the subsidy model. Section 2 presents a procedure to allow poor markets to have complex
vaccines. In Section 3, a two stage goal programming approach is presented which decides
vaccine allocation that requires minimum subsidy and meanwhile maximizes TSS. Section 4
presents the computational results. Section 5 discusses the extension of the problem to
accommodate scenarios in which external producers can provide additional supply of vaccines.

32

3.1 Background and assumptions in the subsidy problem
Any vaccine bundle allocation results in certain amount of total social surplus. If the allocation
corresponds to the solution of the ABP model, then it generates maximum TSS [18]. Consider a
bundle allocation characterized as follows.


A complex and expensive vaccine bundle B is not allocated to a low-income market
segment, M.



The supply capacity of bundle B is tight, which means that all the allocable amount of
bundle B has been totally assigned to some of the market segments.



The supply capacity for producing bundle B cannot be expanded within a short time
frame.

Furthermore, assume that the low-income market segment M must be satisfied with K
doses of bundle B. This implies that the original allocation needs to be changed to accommodate
K doses of bundle B to market segment M. Since bundle B is expensive for market M and it is in
short supply, allocating bundle B to market M would become attractive to manufacturers only
when additional external funding becomes available. The amount of money from a third party
donor that is needed to induce a change on bundle allocation so that an otherwise non-allocated
bundle becomes available to market M is referred as a subsidy.
For market segment M to receive K doses of bundle B, there must be market segments
that would give up some of their bundle B. If originally bundle B is allocated to a single market
segment N, the problem simply consists in determining the dollar amount that will reduce
allocation of bundle B to market N by K doses. However, when bundle B is initially allocated to
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multiple market segments, then a decision has to be made on how many doses each market
segment should contribute to make up the K doses of bundle B demanded by market M. Figure
11 illustrates the two cases described above.

Simpler case: bundle B is
allocated only to market
segment N in the original
allocation.

Market
segment N

K doses

Market
segment M

Market 1

More complex case: bundle B is
allocated to several market
segments in original allocation.

Market 2

Market
segment M

Market 3

Figure 11: Two situations on vaccine distribution

The shuffling of vaccine bundles among market segments results in a new vaccine
allocation and eventually leads to a change on the TSS level. If the initial bundle allocation is not
optimized, then it is possible that the new allocation supersedes the original allocation by
generating a higher TSS. However, in case when the initial allocation corresponds to an ABP
optimal allocation, then any change to it is guaranteed to lead to a lower TSS. In both situations,
it is straight forward that the TSS generated by the new bundle allocation needs to be maximized.
External subsidy is needed to support allocating expensive complex bundles to lowincome markets. In cases where subsidy is required for the fulfillment of such an allocation, it is
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desirable for donors to know the minimum amount of subsidy needed. Therefore, the problem of
determining the new allocation that leads to maximum TSS while requiring minimum level of
subsidy money is referred as the subsidy problem.
3.2 Introduction on the swap procedure
This thesis proposes an optimization model to solve the subsidy problem. The model starts from
an initial vaccine allocation, in which each market segments has already secured the supply of a
given amount of vaccine bundles. (Poorer market segments may not necessarily satisfy all their
immunization needs.) Then the model allows market segments to swap vaccine bundles between
each other. For each swapped bundle, a provider and a receiver is involved. The price of a bundle
is considered as an inherent attribute of the bundle, so when a bundle is swapped, the receiver
market segment is charged the same price for that bundle as the provider market segment. The
model terminates with a new bundle allocation. In the new allocation, one market segment may
obtain bundles that originally belonged to others, while some of its originally owned bundles are
now offered to another market segment. However, the new allocation must guarantee that
doses of expensive combination bundle
segment

are allocated to the target low-income market

.

It is possible that for a swapped bundle, the price at which the provider originally pays
for it exceeds the reservation price of its receiver. Since price is inherent to the bundle, now the
price of this bundle becomes higher than the reservation price of the receiver and therefore
inhibits the receiver from accessing the bundle. In such situations, a subsidy can help the receiver
by artificially increasing its reservation price for the expensive bundle and therefore permitting
the swap.
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The following paragraphs present a simple example about how the bundles are swapped
between two market segments. The example also depicts how a subsidy can be used when
swapping expensive bundles to low-income markets that cannot afford them. In the example, it is
assumed that there are two types of antigens, A and B, and hence there are three different types
of vaccine bundles: A, B and AB. All the bundles are offered by a single producer. It is also
assumed that there is a high-income market segment R and a low-income market segment P.
Market R demands 6 units of antigen A and 5 units of antigen B while market P demands 4 units
of antigen A and 4 units of antigen B. The production capacities of bundles as well as the
reservation prices of the market segments over bundles are described as in Figure 12.

Figure 12: Reservation prices and production capacities of bundles
The example starts with an initial vaccine allocation in which both of the market
segments have some priced bundles to satisfy their demand. Figure 10 illustrates the initial
bundle allocation. The grey shapes represent different bundle types and the numbers inside
correspond to their initial bundle prices. In the initial distribution, high-income market R buys 3
doses of complex bundle AB. Since the production capacity of bundle AB is 3 which does not
adequately satisfy the demand of market R, therefore market R needs to also buy monovalent
bundles A and B. In the initial allocation, low-income market P only has monovalent bundles.
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Market R
$8

Market P

SWAP
$25

$3

$4

$25

$3

$4

$10
$8

Bundle A

$10
$8

Bundle B
$25

$3

$3

$4

$4

Bundle AB

Figure 13: Initial vaccine bundle allocation

Now assume an external party is interested in providing subsidy so that market P has 2
doses of bundle AB. This requires that market R gives up 2 doses of bundles of AB and switches
them to market P. Meanwhile market P must swap 2 doses of A and 2 doses of B to market R
because otherwise market R ends up facing shortage. In Figure 13, the bundles to be swapped are
highlighted by dashed rectangles. The new allocation after the swap is shown in Figure 14.

Market R
$8

$10

Market P
$25

$10
$8

$3

$4

$25

$3

$4

$3
$4

$8

$25

$4

$3

Bundle A
Bundle B
Bundle AB

Figure 14: Vaccine bundle allocation after swaps
.
It can be seen from Figure 14 that in the new distribution, all the swapped vaccine
bundles keep their original prices. Market P now has 2 doses of bundle AB and market R has
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more monovalent bundles. The 2 doses of bundle AB originally purchased by market R at 25
dollars per dose, after swapped to market P, remain at 25 dollars per dose. However, since
market P would pay a maximum of 12 dollars for each bundle AB, there is a need for a subsidy
of 13 dollars per dose to allow market P to buy the swapped AB bundles. The total subsidy
needed to support the illustrated swap is 26 dollars as shown by:

For the monovalent bundles swapped from market P to market R, the prices of the
vaccines are below the reservation prices that market P has for them. Therefore market R can
accept those bundles without the need of any subsidy. The total subsidy needed to support the
new vaccine distribution is 26 dollars.

3.3 A goal programming approach to solve the subsidy problem
This section presents the formulation of the optimization models to determine new bundle
allocation which solve the subsidy problem. The new bundle allocation must generate maximum
TSS while requiring minimum subsidy, which corresponds to a multi-objective optimization
problem. A two-stage goal programming approach is proposed to handle the two objective
functions by assuming that the minimization on subsidy takes precedence over the maximization
on TSS. The first stage model determines a new bundle allocation that result in
bundle

to be attractive to for sale in market

, by minimizing the amount of subsidy required

to sustain it. The first stage model is referred as the SUBSIDY model in this thesis.
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doses of

After the SUBSIDY model is solved, the resulting minimum subsidy is used as input data
for the second stage model, which determines the bundle allocation that maximizes the TSS,
while not exceeding the subsidy resulting from stage 1. The model used in the second stage of
the goal programming approach is referred as the SWAP model.
The next two parts presents the mathematical formulation of the SUBSIDY model and
the SWAP model.

3.3.1 The SUBSIDY model
The SUBSIDY model defines some of its notations, sets and parameters in a similar way
as the ABP model [18]. The SUBSIDY model uses

as the set of market segments that

compose the vaccine market. Types of bundles available in market are included in set . Set

is

composed of different types of antigens. In the SUBSIDY model, market segments swap bundles
among each other with no bundle manufacturer involved. Therefore, set

representing vaccine

bundle manufacturer in the ABP model is omitted in the SUBSIDY model.
The following notations are also used to formulate the SUBSIDY model.
1) Sets
The following sets are used in the SWAP model (same as in the ABP model).


Types of antigens.



Types of vaccine bundles.



Market segments.
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Subset of bundles containing antigen

.

2) Parameters


Number of doses of bundle

that market segment

need to obtain from

other market segments to satisfy an immunization goal.


Reservation price of market



Amount of bundle

on bundle .

initially allocated to market

. When ABP optimal

solution is used as initial input for the subsidy problem, this parameter
corresponds to the ABP optimal allocation.


Initial price per dose of bundle
value of



in market segment

. Similarly to

corresponds to ABP price if the ABP optimal solution is available.

Upper bound of price per dose of bundle b in market m. If the subsidy
problem starts with an ABP optimal solution, then the value of
to the optimal solution of ABP_PF model. Otherwise,




Demand of market segment

corresponds

is set equal to

Annual birth rate of market segment m. This parameter and

is used to

3) Variables
Number of doses of bundle
segment


that is swapped from a supplying market

to the receiving market segment .

The amount of subsidy required to support swap
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.

for antigen .

calculate the immunization demand of market segments.



, the

.

The mathematical formulation of the SUBSIDY model is presented below, followed by a
detailed explanation on the functions of objective function and constraints..
Formulation: The SUBSIDY model.
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The main objective of the SUBSIDY model is to minimize the total subsidy required to
induce the new bundle allocation, which is reflected by equation (3.3.1). Notice that the variable
which corresponds to bundle swaps is not included in (3.3.1). Therefore,

in the

optimal solution of the SUBSIDY model corresponds to any swaps that are feasible for the
SUBSIDY model.
Constraint (3.3.2) ensures that that after a swap, the low-income market segment gets at
least the required target amount of the initially desired vaccines. Constraint (3.3.3) guarantees
that after any swaps, the amount of bundles allocated to each market segment satisfy its
immunization demand. For each bundle type, a market segment cannot swap out more than the
amount of doses originally allocated to that market segment, which is guaranteed by constraint
(3.3.4). Constraint (3.2.5) prevents a market segment swapping bundles to itself.

For any swap

, when

paid by provider market segment
segment

, which means for bundle , the original price
is higher than the upper bound of price that receiver market

can afford, then a non-negative subsidy

value of
sustains swap

is required to support the swap. The

also needs be higher than the value of
. If such a subsidy does not exist then

so that it sufficiently
which implies that the

swap cannot be executed. Constraint (3.2.6) captures to the above discussion. Constraint (3.2.7)
ensures that the values of any subsidy or swap are non-negative.
The solution of the SUBSIDY model gives the values of
minimum subsidy required that allows bundle

to be swapped from market segment

market segment . The optimal objective value
the SWAP model in the second stage of the goal programming approach.
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corresponding to the
to

becomes input data for

3.3.2 The SWAP model
Variable

in an optimal solution of the SUBSIDY model corresponds to a set of

bundle swaps that are feasible to all constraints in the SUBSIDY model. Therefore, it is possible
that in the new allocation, many high value complex bundles are swapped to low-income market
segments while rich market segments receives inexpensive monovalent bundles, which is still
feasible for the SUBSIDY model. Such an allocation would result in great reduction on the level
of total social surplus compared with bundle allocation before swaps.
Besides minimizing the total subsidy, an additional objective of the subsidy problem is
that the bundle allocation maximizes the total social surplus. The SWAP model is solved in the
second stage of the goal programming and the solution gives bundle allocation that maximizes
TSS. Equation (1.4.4) gives the formulation for the maximum TSS in the ABP model [18].

Since no vaccine provider is involved in the SWAP model, we eliminate index
identifies each vaccine producer and

which

is ignored when calculating TSS in the

SWAP model. Then (1.4.4) is converted to (1.4.4a) in which
after swaps.
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represents bundle allocation

For any market segment, the number of bundles it has available after swaps is equal to its
original allocated doses, adding the amount of bundles obtained from other market segment and
subtracting the amount swapped out. This is illustrated by equation (3.3.8).

Then (1.4.4a) is converted to (1.4.4c).

Since
parameter,

is known, for the subsidy problem the bundle allocation are considered as
is constant which can be ignored in (1.4.4c). Therefore, equation

(3.3.9) corresponds to the maximum total social surplus generated by allocation after swaps,
which is used as the objective function of the SWAP model.

The variables in (3.3.9) are

and

corresponding to bundle swaps. Therefore,

the SWAP model optimizes bundle swaps while the SUBSIDY model optimizes subsidy.
The SWAP model keeps all constraints from the SUBSIDY model, with one additional
constraint given by equation (3.3.10)

44

In (3.3.10), the right-hand-side parameter

corresponds to the optimal

objective value of the SUBSIDY model. Constraint (3.3.10) guarantees that any bundle
allocation generated by SWAP can be supported by a subsidy no more expensive than the
minimum subsidy passed from the first stage of the goal programming approach.
The mathematical formulation of the SWAP model is presented as below.
Formulation: The SWAP model.
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3.3.3 Summary on how to solve the subsidy problem
The SUBSIDY model and the SWAP model solve the subsidy problem by generating
corresponding to optimal bundle swaps to induce a new vaccine allocation that maximizes
TSS, as well as

corresponding to the minimum amount of required subsidy that supports

Figure 15 describes the process for solving the subsidy problem.

GOAL PROGRAMMING
1st Stage
Solve the
SUBSIDY model

Start with an initial
bundle allocation
2nd Stage
Solve the
SWAP model

Figure 15: How to solve the subsidy problem
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Optimal solution
Swaps generating
maximum TSS
while requiring
minimum subsidy.

.

3.4 Computational results
In this section, a computational example is used to illustrate how the subsidy problem is solved.
Four different market segments are included: rich, medium, low-income and poorest market
segments. Multiple types of bundles are available in the market, which are categorized based on
the complexity. The available bundle categories are very expensive 4-antigen bundles, expensive
3-antigen bundles, inexpensive 2-antigen bundles as well as the least expensive monovalent
bundles. The reservation price at each market segment for the different bundles is shown as in
Figure 16.
Reservation Price in $USD
Market Segments
Rich
Medium
Low-income
Poorest

Monovalent Bundle

2-antigen Bundle

24
6
2
1

3-antigen Bundle

60
15
6
2

4-antigen Bundle

100
25
10
3

140
35
14
5

Figure 16: Market segment's reservation price on bundles
Figure 16 shows a stronger preference by richer market segments for more complex
bundles. Therefore, bundle allocation generates high total social surplus by assigning complex
bundles to rich markets. So the initial bundle allocation and prices are as shown in Figure 17, in
which more complex bundles are assigned to the richer market segment.

30 doses

40 doses

60 doses

4-antigen
bundles

3-antigen
bundles

2-antigen
bundles

monovalent
bundles

$USD 90

$USD 20

$USD 5

$USD 0.5

Rich

Medium

Poor

Figure 17: Initial bundle allocation and prices
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120 doses

Poorest

Assume that it is required that the poorest market must have 30 doses of most complex 4antigen bundles. This resulting problem can be solved by the proposed two-stage goal
programming approach. Figure 18 illustrates the solution generated by the SUBSIDY model.

Rich

Medium

Low-income

Poorest

4-antigen
bundles

3-antigen
bundles

2-antigen
bundles

monovalent
bundles

$USD 90

$USD 20

$USD 5

$USD 0.5

30 doses
Subsidy = $USD 2550

120 doses
Subsidy = 0
Rich

Medium

Low-income

Poorest

monovalent
bundles

3-antigen
bundles

2-antigen
bundles

4-antigen
bundles

$USD 0.5

$USD 20

$USD 5

$USD 90

Figure 18: Solution of the first stage model
In Figure 18, by requirement the rich market swaps all 30 doses of complex 4-antigen
bundles to the poorest market. The gap between the 4-antigen bundle price and poorest market’s
reservation price is USD$ 85 per dose. Therefore, USD$ 2550 of subsidy are required to support
the swap of 30 bundles. With 30 doses of 4-antigen bundles taken away, the rich market faces
bundle insufficiency. Therefore the poorest market must simultaneously swap 120 doses of
monovalent bundles to the rich market segment. The transfer of monovalent bundles to the rich
market segment does not require subsidy support.
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The resulting USD$ 2550 corresponding to the minimized subsidy then becomes input
data for the SWAP model. Figure 19 illustrates solution generated by the second stage model.

Subsidy = 0

Subsidy = 0

40 doses

60 doses

Rich

Medium

Low-income
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monovalent
bundles

3-antigen
bundles

2-antigen
bundles

4-antigen
bundles

$USD 0.5

$USD 20

$USD 5

$USD 90

Subsidy = 0
120 doses

Rich

Medium

Low-income

Poorest

3-antigen
bundles

2-antigen
bundles

monovalent
bundles

4-antigen
bundles

$USD 20

$USD 5

$USD 0.5

$USD 90

Final bundle allocation
Figure 19: Bundle swaps in the second stage solution

From Figure 19, it can be seen that in order to maximize TSS, the SWAP model swaps
more complex bundles to richer market segments. All swaps in SWAP solution do not require
subsidy support. Figure 19 shows the final bundle allocation in which poorest market has 30
doses of 4-antigen bundle as desired. The minimum amount of subsidy needed to achieve such
an allocation is USD$ 2550.
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3.5 A variation on the subsidy problem.
When the subsidy problem starts from an initial allocation in which the demands of all market
segments are satisfied, then the goal programming procedure generates new allocation that
satisfies all market segments. However, if in the initial allocation the total amount of allocable
bundle does not satisfy the overall demand of all market segments, then merely swapping
bundles results in a new allocation in which one or more market segments will still face bundle
insufficiency. Therefore, this section proposes a method to handle such a situation by making
small changes on the input data of the SUBSIDY model and the SWAP model.
3.5.1 Solve subsidy problem with supply insufficiency
External bundle provider must exist in order to fill the gap between overall bundle supply
and bundle demand in the initial allocation, while neither the SWAP model nor the SUBSIDY
model is designed to formulate bundle producers. However, the problem can be resolved by
tweaking the input data of the SUBSIDY and SWAP model so that the external bundle provider
can be modeled as a dummy market segment. The dummy market segment must have the
following characters.


The amount of bundles initially allocated to the dummy market segment must
sufficiently cover the overall bundle shortage in the initial allocation.



Reservation prices of the dummy market for any type of bundle must be zero.
This is to guarantee that bundles are not swapped to the dummy market segment
for increase of TSS.



The demand of dummy market segment on any bundle is zero.
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Additionally, it is assumed for any

which is the number of bundle

originally

allocated to the dummy market segment, the corresponding bundle price is illustrated by
equation (3.5.1)

In (3.5.1),

is a input parameter representing an desired percentage on return of

investment for producing bundle

. Equation (3.5.1) makes sure that the external bundle

producer provides a bundle only when the bundle price is attractive.
After the initial bundle allocation, reservation price and demand are decided for the
dummy market segment, the dummy market segment is integrated with other market segments to
construct a scenario for the subsidy problem. Then the same goal programming approach
introduced in Section 3.3 can be used to solve the problem and find out optimal swap
well as minimum subsidy

as

. The next section shows an experimentation of solving subsidy

problem with dummy market segment included.

3.5.2 Experimentation results
In this experiment, the available bundle types as well as each market segment’s demand
and reservation price for bundles are the same as the data presented in Figure 6, 7, 8 and 9 in
section 2.4. Figure 20 shows the initial bundle allocation for the subsidy problem. Notice that in
Figure 20, market segment 5 is the dummy market segment corresponding to bundle provider.
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Figure 20: Initial bundle allocation and prices

From Figure 20, we can see that market segment 4 corresponding to the poorest market
segments does not have enough bundles to satisfy its vaccine demand. Therefore, additional
bundles must be provided by the dummy market segment corresponding to the external bundle
provider. Additionally, it is assumed that the poorest market segment must have 10 million doses
of bundle DTaP-HBV-HiB-IPV, which is the most expensive complex bundle.
Then the two-stage goal programming approach is used to solve the described problem.
Figure 21 shows the solution generated by the SUBSIDY model.
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Figure 21: Solution of the SUBSIDY model

From Figure 21, we can see that in the solution generated by the SUBSIDY model, the
poorest market segment has 10 million doses of DtaP-HBV-HiB-IPV bundle, in which 8 million
doses is contributed by the middle-income market segment, while 2 million are transferred from
the dummy market segment. In order to avoid expensive subsidy, the model chose to swap
bundle DtaP-HBV-HiB-IPV from middle-income market segment instead of rich market
segment, since the original price of this bundle is much higher in the rich market segment. The
total amount of subsidy required is $USD 154,820,000.
Figure 21 also shows that monovalent bundles have been swapped to the middle-income
market segment to substitute the combination vaccines swapped to the poorest market segment.
The demand of all market segments are satisfied by the allocation illustrated in Figure 21.
Then the value of minimum subsidy is passed to the SWAP model to find out optimal
bundle allocation that maximizes the TSS. Figure 22 shows the solution of the SWAP model.
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Figure 22: Solution of the SWAP model

From Figure 22, it can be seen that the SWAP model maximizes by transfer more
complex bundles to richer market segments. For example, bundle HBV-HiB is swapped from the
poorest market to the low-income market, while low-income market segment has swapped triantigen bundles to the middle-income market segments. The solution of the SWAP model gives
the swaps that induce the final bundle allocation in which the demand of all market segments are
satisfied and the poorest market segment has 10 million doses of bundle DTaP-HBV-HiB-IPV.
The minimum subsidy required to support this allocation is $USD 154,820,000.
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis presents the author’s research work at RIT from the September 2008 to July 2011.
During the first two years, the author’s research focused on looking for a way to reduce the time
needed to solve the ABP problem and find out optimal bundle allocation and prices. Attempted
methodologies include auction models, game theory models as well as dynamic programming
approach, which all showed limitations. Linearization of the ABP model has also been
attempted, which brings more variables into the formulation and hence limits its application. The
author then successfully developed a heuristics approach to separate the ABP problem into
sequential small problems and use the ABP_R(i) model to solve each of the small problems, and
eventually solves the ABP problem. Compared with the ABP model, the heuristics method
reduces the solution time to 1/300 while generating TSS that is 99.93% of original. Since year
2010, the author has been working on the development of an optimization model to decide the
minimum subsidy needed to enable poor countries to have expensive combination vaccines. The
ABP model does not include subsidy in the scope. Therefore in the solution of the ABP model,
poor market segments always have monovalent vaccines or less complex combination vaccines.
However include the subsidy into the ABP model would result in more variables in the
formulation which is MINLP and eventually leads to prolonged solving time. So, the thesis
focused on constructing Linear Programming models that can use the solution of the ABP model
as an initial input. The research results in the SUBSIDY model and the SWAP model which
successfully solves the subsidy problem. In the computational experiment presented in section
3.5, it is assumed that external vaccine manufacturer is willing to provide complex bundle at the
price of $USD 30 per dose. Purchasing 10 million doses of such bundle for the poorest market
segment requires a subsidy of USD$ 300,000,000. The solution of the proposed goal
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programming approach shows that the same objective can be achieved by swapping some of the
complex bundles from other market segments, while requiring a subsidy of only $USD
154,820,000 which corresponds to a 50% reduction.
More research work can be done which will potentially further reduce the required
amount of subsidy. The SUBSIDY model and SWAP model presented in this thesis treat price of
bundles as fixed parameter. However, when transferring an inexpensive bundle from a poorer
market segment to a richer market segment, since the richer market segment have higher
reservation price on the transferred bundle, it is possible to allow bundle price to be increased.
Then the additional revenue generated by increasing bundle price can be part of the total subsidy
and thus reduce the amount of subsidy required from external donors. The author of this thesis is
going to explore into such opportunities and present results in future publications.
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